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THE RELATION OF MORALS TO LAW
What has been said applies more obviously to the lawmaker than to
the administrator or adjudicator of the law. But the administrator or
adjudicator, though in duty bound to valid law as it comes to him,
should be guided by the same principles to the extent they can be applied to his special responsibilities. He too must remember that the
foundation of our society is the natural and revealed law, in the light
of which positive law must be interpreted and applied. To the extent
this is not possible then the particular law is a bad law.
The matter may be stated in another way. In both the natural and
the supernatural order the State is an instrument for the achievement
by man of his last end. Whether this end be expressed in terms of life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, or in terms of life everlasting in
its most exalted sense, it is susceptible of successful achievement only
in a manner which is consistent with morality. This is not only the
teaching of history but of reason and of revelation. Law is one of the
great facets of such a State and should further its purpose by making
the relationship between law and morals in reality as close as possible
to the ideal, that is, to coincidence.
Needless to say every law does not partake of this character, but
such departures as there are do not establish the relationship which
should exist.
Rules of law are rules of conduct, and therefore they are necessarily surrounded by an atmosphere of morality: with the
Greeks the connexion between ethics and the administration
of justice was especially' close and productive of direct results.5
Surely no less should be the connection between morals and the law of
our day and of our future.

MAX RHEINSTEIN*

I
Man craves for opposites: liberty and order. While loath to limit his
own freedom of unpredictable action, he is constantly striving for security through predictability. He speculates about, or inquires into,
the secrets of nature in order to predict, or even to manipulate, its
course. He seeks to reduce the insecurity threatening from his fellow
human beings by predicting or "regulating" their behavior. CivilizaG2 VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDF-NCE 265 (1922).
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tion implies social order. This social order, which is forever threatened
by the individual's urge for freedom, is based upon regularities of
human behavior grounded in man's biological nature. It is predictable that, at certain intervals, man will have to eat, drink and sleep,
that he will engage in sexual activities or that he will seek shelter and
clothing. It is predictable that he will seek to satisfy his psychological
need for recognition. Another wide range of predictability is provided
by man's tendency to imitate the behavior of others, especially of those
to whom he ascribes exemplariness and authority, and, even more
strongly, by his tendency to follow established habits and traditions.
Finally, human behavior is made predictable by man's creation of norms,
by the existence within his mind of ideas that certain lines of behavior
are demanded of him, that he ought or ought not to conduct himself in
certain ways. These contents of the mind are productive of the behavior demanded by the idea of an "or else." The norm is characterized
by its sanction. Among normative ideas, four types are noteworthy
because of their eminent importance for the achievement of social order, four types which are distinguished not by the nature of the conduct demanded but solely by the sanction taking place or expected to
take place in the case of failure to obey.
The first of these norm systems, that of social convention,' is characterized by the unorganized disapproval by our fellow human beings
which may range all the way from mild censure hardly expressed at all
to ridicule or social ostracism. There are, second, the norms of morality, which have their sanction in our minds, in the pangs of conscience
which will disturb us in the case of transgression, in the shame we
feel and the sense of insufficiency by which are plagued. It is beyond our
present task to investigate whence these feelings originate. Certain it
is that among their causes ideas of our fellow human beings are playing an important role, a role so important, indeed, that the very term
"norms of morality" (or ethics) has a double meaning. Even though
in the case of certain conduct an individual may be entirely devoid of
self-reproach or shame, his fellow men may judge that "he ought to
be ashamed" and subject him to their unorganized disapproval. When
understood in this sense as the mores of the community, the norms of
morality constitute a part of the norm system of social etiquette, the
very existence of which is one of the factors productive of those norms
of morality for which there is no judge other than each man himself
and in his own heart.
1
A better name would be desirable. What is meant is more than norms regulating dress, salutations or the proper conduct of a wedding. The term social convention covers the entire realm of conduct expected of us and approved by our
fellow citizens. For instance, marriage, i.e., the type of sexual conduct which is
approved in a given society and thus distinguished from all other, disapproved
manners of sexual conduct, is as much an institution of "social convention" as
property, inheritance or grammar.
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Thirdly, there are the norms of religion, which have their sanction
in the idea of disapproval by the deity, the wrath of the gods or some
other detriment supernaturally incurred.
Finally, there are, at least in so-called higher society, the norms
which are sanctioned by the action of some special functionary or politically organized society. We may call them, for the moment, the governmental norms. The sanction guaranteeing the behavior demanded
is the infliction of some painful experience by the public executioner,
the gaoler, the sheriff and his deputies, or some similar official.
In their totality these norm systems are to a high degree conducive
to social order. If certain normative ideas are generally present within
the minds of the members of a given society, behavior according to the
norms can be predicted with a high degree of probability. It has already been observed that the classification of a norm as belonging to
one or the other system does not depend upon its content but solely
upon its sanction. Thus, one and the same norm can belong to more
than one system. The norm forbidding to kill a fellow human being is
sanctioned in our society by unorganized social disapproval, by individual self-reproach (at least in the normal case), by the notion of
God's disapproval (at least on the part of the believer) and by the action of policemen, state's attorneys, judges, gaolers or the executioner.
One or the other of the four sanctions may, indeed, be absent in the
case of one or the other particular norm, but the case of some particular behavior being demanded by one norm system alone constitutes the
exception rather than the rule. It happens in the case of certain religious norms, certain norms of social etiquette, as, for instance those
prescribing the modes of dress or the formalities of politeness; it also
happens in the case of norms of morality addressed to himself by a man
of peculiarly refined conscience. By and large, it may be said, however,
that the transgression of a religious norm will also bring about the
sanction of social disapproval, or that the violation of a norm of etiquette may produce self-reproach, especially if there has been implied
an expression of disrespect for another. Quite particularly can it be
said that, at least normally, there hardly exists a governmental norm
which is not also a norm of social etiquette. The governmental rule,
as it were, is constituted by the addition of the governmental sanction
to the informal sanction where the latter is believed to be insufficient to
secure general compliance.
Contrary to an opinion widely held, it is asserted here that there is
no particular type of conduct which could not have sought to be guaranteed by any one of the four sanctions. The sanctions of a supernatural detriment or of informal social disapproval may be attached to a
traffic rule just as the governmental sanction may and has been used
for the purpose of achieving certain uniform lines of thought, of religious belief or even of feeling. The insight that there is no special
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domain of content of the governmental rule has in recent years been
emphasized quite particularly by Max Radin. 2 He concedes, it is true,
that there exists a peculiar sphere of the governmental rules consisting of those rules which regulate the very procedure of the governmental functionaries and agencies, especially the courts. However, these
rules of procedure are of an auxiliary nature. Although they are
of the utmost importance for the proper functioning of the social
order, they are not meant to motivate the conduct of the members of
the society in their relations to one another; their purpose is primarily
that of limiting the powers which society has found itself compelled
to entrust to its political functionaries and to equalize the position of
adversaries of whom one is seeking to call these political functionaries
into action against the other. The sanction of the procedural rule is
either the imposition of some detriment upon one functionary of government by another, or a deterioration in the relative position of one
adversary in his dispute with another before a governmental functionary.
II
The norms which we have so far called those of government are more
commonly called those of law. We have so far avoided this word because
it is ambiguous and loaded with emotional content. In the sense in
which the term is used here the norms of law are those norms of social
behavior which are sanctioned by the action of some functionary of
politically organized society. Law, in this sense, is simply and plainly
the command of the sovereign. This definition is that of legal positivism, a position which has been violently attacked in the past as well as
in the present. Positivism has been blamed as justifying not only
fascism or national-socialism, but of any despotism of whatever kind.
Positivism has been charged with laying the foundations of tyranny
and of any nihilism striving to present the outward appearance of
order.
Positivism, so it seems, is nothing but the position of Thrasymachus,
in which law is simply identified with power, or the attitude so often
ascribed to Hegel3 when he is said to glorify the State as a last end in
itself. Positivism, so it is said, separates the law and the State from all
ethical values, exempts them from all moral judgment and thus renders
possible their vicious growth into all-devouring monsters.
Yet, some consideration of simple logic ought to make us pause before we join in with this chorus of condemnation. How can a mere definition have such consequences? How can a definition ever justify a political postulate or position? It can be either correct or false as far
RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPEMRINCs (1940).
3 Wrongly, it ought to be observed.
2
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as there is concerned its accordance with the actual usage of the word
concerned. It can be either clarifying or confusing insofar as we are
interested in the clarification of our insight into the actual phenomenon
referred to by that word. Hence, the definition of law attacked as that
of positivism is devoid of any of the pernicious consequences ascribed
to it as long as it is treated as no more than a definition, i.e., as long as
it is not combined with a political postulate, viz., the postulate that
norms of law are not only different from norms of morality, at least
as far as the sanction is concerned, but that they are also independent
thereof in the sense of their not being subject to any evaluation or
criticism from the point of view of morality. When it is conceived of
in this "substantive" rather than in a purely "formal" sense, positivism
is more than a definition of the term law; it is that political creed which
holds that the commands of the sovereign are ultimate values in themselves which are above any evaluation under any other standard and
which, therefore, nobody is entitled to criticize from the point of view
of morality, religion or any other conceivable standard. It may be
doubted whether substantive positivism has ever been advocated in this
radical form. Even the worst villains of history have been trying to
justify their tyrannical measures by moral or religious pretensions.
Yet, there have been approximations to the position of substantive positivism, quite particularly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when, especially on the European continent, but, to some extent
also in the countries of the common law, lawyers were told that ethical
evaluation of the norms of law was none of their business, that they
had to apply these norms as they found them handed down through history or enacted by the legislature and that ethical evaluation of the
positive law was the exclusive concern of the lawmakers. 4 In the milder
form, substantive positivism, while it appears to be derived from the
democratic doctrine of separation of powers, has tended to exclude from
the criticism of the law those who are among the most competent to do
so, and to make courts and lawyers tools of the socially and politically
dominant group or groups.
The dangerous doctrine of substantive positivism has naturally called
for criticism when it was threatening to become a political reality. Unfortunately, however, the criticism has frequently been directed, not
against the doctrine that the governmentally sanctioned norms of social conduct are exempt from moral criticism and evaluation, but against
that definition of law which takes account solely of the governmental
4The author remembers his very first class hour in law school, in which the
instructor, one of Germany's most celebrated legal scholars, warned the eager
young students against any confusion of law with justice. "Gentlemen," he pronounced, "you may expect that as lawyers you will have to deal with justice. You
ought to free yourselves of this error. As lawyers you will have to deal with law
and nothing but law. Do not meddle with the business of those others whose concern may be justice."

292
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sanction and does not include any criteria of content. Recognizing the
dangers of the political doctrine of material positivism, social thinkers
have found it advisable to devise definitions of law which include some
moral value as one of its constituent elements. Among such efforts to
define law as containing essentially some ethical value, two groups may
be distinguished viz.: first, definitions containing some concrete ethical
value, such as liberty (Kant, Stammler, recently also Bodenheimer) or
reason (St. Thomas, rationalists); and second, definitions containing
some formal element to be filled with varying ethical contents, such as
the proletarian class interest (Communists), the interest of the national
or racial community (National-Socialists), culture (Gurvitch), reciprocity (Malinowski), or ethical-imperative coordination (Timasheff).
All these mutually contradictory definitions of law agree in the one
point of refusing to apply the word "law" to a governmental norm or
a system of governmental norms which does not fulfill the concrete
ethical postulate in question. For the Kantian, for instance, the governmental norm which is incompatible with liberty is not law, whilst the
Thomist finds himself compelled to deny this word to the "unreasonable" governmental norm. The fact that the norm in question is
being enforced by the police, uniformed or secret, the courts, sheriffs,
gaolers, executioners or other governmental functionaries is regarded
as irrelevant.
Of course, we may, with Humpty Dumpty, use words as we please.
There can be no objection to such an arbitrary, subjective use of words,
except that it is hardly conducive to understanding and that it is likely to
result in confusion. In our particular case, experience has shown that
the various "ethical" definitions of law have not only not been helpful
in the clarification of the relation between law and ethics but have
rather achieved the very opposite result, apart from the fact that they
are also incompatible with the common usage of the word law. It would
be difficult to convince the judges of a tyrant, a colonial tribunal, or a
military government court that the norms they administer are not law
but something else.
The efforts to include into the definition of law some ethical value regarded as positive, and consequently to deny the term law to any norm
or norm system by which that value is not satisfied, harmful though it is
to clarity of thought, is easily explainable as an instance of a frequent
and important psychological phenomenon. Followers for any cause can be
recruited more easily when this cause is presented not as still impotent
or struggling but as already powerful and victorious. "The victory of
our cause is certain" has been the slogan of every experienced propagandist for every religious, political or national cause. The same psychological trick is applied, mostly unconsciously, when some ideal sought
to be achieved is presented as an already, or sometimes a necessarily,

THE RELATION OF MORALS TO LAW
existing one. Naturally law is the classical example. The propagandistic
force of some social ideal sought to be achieved is increased when it
is presented as already existing "in nature," just as the propagandistic
efforts of the advocates of conservatism are strengthened when the
existing social system is presented as being grounded upon natural necessity. When law is presented as necessarily and essentially containing the element of freedom, or reason, or some other element, the
chances are considerably increased that a law containing such element
will be achieved. By consistently maintaining that law essentially contains the elements of reason or liberty, schoolmen and natural law
philosophers were able effectually to curb the despotic aspirations of
medieval rulers or eighteenth century absolutist kings. The ethical definitions of law have been a powerful and salutary weapon in mankind's
struggle to curb despotism. As an intellectual tool, however, these definitions have been harmful. The political dangers ascribed to the formalistic definition of law are imaginary, provided positivism is conceived of not in the substantive but in the formal sense, i.e., in the sense
that the rules of law, which are defined by the mere formal criterion
of the governmental sanction, are consistently regarded as being subject to ethical evaluation and criticism. In formal positivism, the rules
of law, while they are conceptually kept apart from those of ethics and
devoid of any necessary ethical content, are brought into relation with
the rules of ethics by being regarded as occupying in relation to them
an inferior position and as being necessarily subject to constant ethical
evaluation. Only in this way, we believe, are we able to maintain correspondence between social reality and our descriptive analysis thereof,
as well as to obtain a clearer insight into the relation between law and
ethics and thus to understand the meaning of justice, which, in its
most important meaning, is nothing but the ethical standard by which
we measure the law in its totality as a system as well as with respect
to its several individual norms. The just law is the law which is positively evaluated by the standard of ethics. However, before we enter
upon the discussion of how this standard is to be conceived, we first
should inquire into another meaning of the words "just" and "justice."
III
In a very general sense we speak of the just man. What we mean
thereby is not much different from the virtuous man. The just man is
he who not only professes the ethical ideals of his community but is
actually practicing them in his dealings with his fellow men. In a community generally professing the ethical ideal of social harmony through
respect for the dignity of every human being, the just man is he who
practices this ideal and who is particularly unwavering in the expression of his respect for the dignity of all his fellow human beings without paying regard to such irrelevant factors as race, creed, sex or na-
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tionality. In this general sense the adjective "just" is simply the expression of a general ethical value judgment of a man with respect to his
social attitudes and relations.
We are coming closer to the sphere of law when we speak of the just
judge. The just judge is he who is living up to the ideal which a given
society has established for its judges. In our society the term means
the impartial judge who, uninfluenced by such "illegitimate" considerations as personal bias or predilection, fear, anger, etc., incorruptibly
renders his decisions in strict accordance with the law.
In other words, the just judge is the judge who judges strictly by th
law. The latter term needs some explanation in this connection. It is
used here in exactly the same sense in which we have defined it, viz.,
those norms of social behavior which are sanctioned by the threat of an
officer of politically organized society going into action against the
transgressor. For its own protection against the ever-present danger of
abuse of the power monopolistically entrusted by society to its "government," society has invented the device of separation of functions.
Just as in a well-organized business the disbursing offiicer is not to
make any payments until he is told to do so by another independent
functionary, thus, in a politically organized society which has not yet
returned to the state of police omnipotence, the force officers (sheriff,
police, jailer, executioner, etc.) are not to go into action against any
individual unless they are told to do so by another offiicer, viz., a judge.
This other officer is expected not to issue his order to the force officer
except upon an objective investigation as to whether or not there exists
one of those factual situations in which alone the law orders or permits
the application of governmental force against an individual. The norms
of law may thus be conceived as being addressed not only to the members of society at large but to its governmental officers, in order to let
them know in what circumstances alone they are allowed or expected
legitimately to use the powers of force entrusted to them.
These statements do not imply, however, that the norms of law must
always and of necessity be formulated in clear words before they can
be "applied" by the judge. The norms of the law may be as inarticulate
and as little formulated as many or perhaps most of the norms of ethics
or social etiquette. Formulation of any of these norms does not take
place until their existence becomes doubtful. In an undiversified society
the norms of ethics and etiquette are being felt and lived but little talked
about. Only in cases of transgression or doubt does it become necessary
to formulate them. Thus in the "folk society ' 5 the judge "finds" the law
by giving articulate expression to the value judgments which are already living in the community. While his activities are creative in the
5 Dr. Robert Redfield, Professor of Anthropology, University of Chicago, has,
done considerable work in this connection.
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sense of giving a first expression, and thus clarification, to an idea
which has so far but vaguely been felt, he does not make a new norm.
By adding to the pre-existing moral or social sanction the new sanction
of governmental action, he also transforms the pre-existing moral or
social norm into a more clearly articulated legal norm. But even such a
kadi is judging not outside of, but in accordance with, the law, since
in his type of society the law has not yet been separated from morals
and etiquette but is found in these realms and applied through the articulation of the norms already obtaining in them.
In our complex society, rules of law are usually conceived as being
formulated in words and expressed in such officially recognized "sources
of law" as statutes, precedents, learned doctrine, books of authority, etc.
Where such articulation has taken place the judges are expected to
render their decisions in accordance with the norms thus formulated.
However, occasional aberrations notwithstanding, there exists the fairly
general insight that not all the law is and ever can be contained in the
words of the articulated norms. Life is so immensely manifold that not
even the greatest accumulation of human experience and foresight can
ever provide a ready-made norm for every situation that may actually
occur. Day in and day out the courts have to decide cases for which
they cannot find a ready preformulated norm. Yet, even in such cases
we do not expect our judges to decide according to their own individual
arbitrariness but in accordance with the law. While technically more
complicated, the case is not essentially different from that of the kadi.
By considering the ethical and social value judgments which have found
expression in the formulated norms of law and by probing into the deeper layer of unarticulated, or at least not yet legally articulated, value
judgments, the judge is expected to "find" the legally correct decision
in the very act of "creating" a new legal norm. The newly formulated
norm, if the decision is to be just, must be in harmony with the preexisting system of legal, social and moral value judgments. Obviously,
this task is easier in a simple society in which there exists a large
measure of uniformity of social value judgments, or in a totalitarian
society where only one system of value judgments is officially recognized,
than it is in the free and complex society of present-day America where
often incompatible systems of value judgments are competing with each
other.
Finally, the just judge is not necessarily he who in all and every circumstance is invariably rendering his decision in strict accordance with
the formulated norms of law even where they exist. Again we have to remember that life is too manifold to be covered entirely by a network
of articulated norms. Every articulation is but a necessarily insufficient
attempt to express in words a value judgment that is felt more or less
vaguely. The articulation may be too broad and may thus cover a case in
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which the value judgment expressed is felt to be inapplicable lest it be
perverted. The just judge has to sense such situations. He has to be
ready to correct the law in the interest of the law lest summum ius be
perverted into summa iniuria. The law in the strict sense of the sum
total of its formulated rules must be tempered with equity (in the sense
of Roman aequitas), i.e., by those moral and social value judgments
which have sought to find, but have not fully succeeded in finding, articulation in the formulated norms. The law is constituted by the two together, the formulated rules and equity, and the just judge is he and
only he who masters the art of tempering and supplementing the law
with equity without thereby incurring the vice of arbitrariness.
IV
This analysis of the meaning of the word just as applied to the judge
is but a first step in the analysis of the multi-meaningful word justice.
If we agree that the just judge is the judge who judges in accordance
with the law, we are, of necessity, driven to another question, viz., the
question of the justice of the law. Unless we subscribe to the doctrines
of substantive positivism or to one of the substantive definitions of law
criticized above, we have to recognize that law may be unjust. Indeed,
this proposition is the essence of the approach of formal positivism advocated here. But what is the test of the justice of the law? A first, but
not final, answer finds this test in the degree of the law's accordance
with the moral and social value judgments of the society in question.0
Just, in this sense, is the law which agrees with these value judgments;
unjust, the law which disagrees with them. As long as law is "created"
by the articulation of the value judgments already living in the community, no such discrepancy can arise. However, law can be created in other
ways: it can be imposed upon a community by a foreign conqueror or
occupant, or by a native tyrant, or by a ruling clique or class; or law
can become the domain of a profession of specialists in whose hands its
developments are guided into channels of its own which may easily lead
away from the original source of community values with the result that
the law becomes volksfremd and constitutes a more or less self-sufficient
system of norms cut off from community convictions; or, in modern
complex society, convictions about moral values may become so vague,
indeterminate or conflicting that there no longer exists a body of generally accepted social and moral value judgments with which the law
could correspond. Perhaps in the last-named case one should not speak
of the law as unjust; but certainly this word is appropriately applied to
the selfish or arbitrary command of the despot, of the despotic clique or
of the foreign conqueror. As long as their laws are in opposition to the
value judgments held and cherished by the people, they are felt by them
6

Or, more correctly, of its gravior pars.
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as unjust. Examples have been innumerable in the world's history from
the inhuman command of Kreon in Sophocles' Antigone to the modern
laws seeking to impose the language of a foreign conqueror upon a subject population, be it in the former Prussian parts of Poland, in South
Tyrol or in Puerto Rico.
V
At this stage of our reflections we have reached the point where we
are able to say that a law or legal system will be regarded as just by
Papuans, modern Fascists or Communists if it corresponds to their
respective ethical ideals and convictions. Such a relativistic and subjective answer does not satisfy our quest for justice which makes us
yearn for a more objective answer. We can give such an answer easily
if we identify ourselves with any one of the ethical systems, all of
which, by their very essence, claim objective and universal validity.
However, this way out may appear too easy to one who has observed
the variety and so often mutually exclusive nature of ethical systems.
Which of these ethical systems shall we make our own? Which one or
which ones are just? From the question as to the justice of laws or legal
systems we are driven to the question as to the justice of ethical systems.
Where do we find the standard for the ethical evaluation of ethical
systems? The standard which is frequently offered to us is that of reason. Reason, so we are told, tells us how we can achieve the Good Society and thus provides us with the ultimate standard of justice for
which we are searching. This, indeed, has been the answer of the philosophers of what has been called the Great Tradition of Western Civilization all the time since Socrates. We have been referred to reason by
Plato and Aristotle, by St. Thomas and later schoolmen, by Hobbs,
Locke and the thinkers of the Enlightenment, by Kant, Humboldt and
Hegel, just as well as by Marx or by contemporary liberals or NeoScholastics. Throughout this Great Tradition the aim has been the same,
viz., the peaceful and harmonious society. Whatever controversy there
has been within it-and such controversy has been frequent and lively
or even violent-such controversy has been concerned with the structure
of the Good Society and with the ways and means by which the peaceful
and harmonious social order can be achieved. Is the Good Society to be
static or dynamic, is it to be hierarchic or equalitarian? Reason is invoked to provide us with the answer to this and similar questions, with
controversy again existing as to the problem of whether reason ought
to be applied a priori or a posteriori.
Recognizing all the profound differences which we find between
Platonism and Aristotelianism, between Conservatism and Liberalism, between Scholasticism and Enlightenment, between Individualism
and Socialism, or among all the other systems developed within the
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Great Tradition, they all agree, to some large extent at least, in the following three points, viz.:
(1) The Good Society is that which is peaceful, orderly and harmonious.
(2) The way in which to achieve the Good Society can be found
through the application of reason.
(3) Diversity of opinion about the results of the application of reason can ultimately be solved through the process of discussion.
In contemporary America we agree almost generally that the Good
Society ought to be dynamic rather than static, equalitarian rather
than hierarchic; that it should be based upon respect for the dignity of
the individual and the recognition of his basic rights and liberties; that
there should be an economy of abundance with the largest possible
spread of the enjoyment of material goods; that political power has
the primary purpose of safeguarding these liberties; and also, although
somewhat controversial, that human welfare and security should be
promoted through certain democratically determined common enterprises; that power, both political and economic, ought to be kept under
strict control, however; and that excessive concentrations of power
ought to be prevented. Within this general pattern the Good Society is
expected to be achieved, or is regarded as having been achieved already, and the just law is that which furthers, or at least does not
prevent, the achievement or preservation of this social order. Recognizing that there exist wide divergencies even within the Great Tradition,
we can still say, however, that the just law is that which reason shows us
as being apt to facilitate, or at least not to impede, the achievement and
preservation of a peaceful and harmonious order of society, in whatever shape this peaceful and harmonious order is visualized in detail.
The implications of this proposition are far-reaching. Reason is reflection about experience. Thus we have to use the accumulated experience of mankind together with systematic observation of social and
natural realities and apply to them the refined techniques of dispassionate reflection as especially developed in the social sciences for the
attempt of predicting the results of a given system of ethics as a whole
as well as of concrete laws or proposed laws. By following this method
we are able to a considerable extent to determine whether such a system, law or proposed law is likely to promote or to impede our approximation to the eirenic ideal of the peaceful and harmonious society.
Yet, we must also be careful not to overestimate the powers of reason. It is a precious and powerful, but not an infallible, tool. Reality is
too complex to be penetrated in all its interrelations and complications.
Man is not omniscient. The range of all his accumulated knowledge is
limited. Only to a certain degree can we isolate some single social factor and determine all its causes and possible results. Experimentation
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is hardly possible at all in the social realm. Finally, and perhaps most
important of all, man is motivated in his action not only, or perhaps
not so much, by reason, but also by passion and emotion, whose directions are largely unforeseeable.
This very same insight into human nature will also make us modest
as to our ultimate goal. We must know that the just society can never
be perfectly achieved by sinful man. And yet, we must never cease to
strive for it and we must never cease either to apply our reason, limited
though its power may be, to determine, as far as it is possible to us,
whether a given social system, law or proposed law is compatible with
the ideal for which we are ever to strive though knowing that, at best,
we may be able to approximate, but never to achieve it.
VI
There still remains for our reflection one final problem. We have defined the just law as that law which reason shows us to be conducive to,
or at least compatible with, a peaceful and harmonious social order.
We have to recognize, however, that this peaceful and harmonious social order is not universally recognized as the ultimate social ideal. In
every man we find two antagonistic tendencies: that toward order, security and predictability and that toward antagonistic self-assertion.
By observation we are led to recognize that there are human beings in
whom the antagonistic tendencies are so strong that the ideal of a peaceful and harmonious society appears to them abhorrent and that they
regard as the good society that in which continuous struggle provides
eternal opportunity for the strong or the cunning, the hero or the fox,
to achieve and enjoy the thrills and excitements of fight, victory, power and glory, including the glory of heroic defeat and self-destruction.
The events of the last few decades have, or at least should have, demonstrated the reality of the existence of this ideal even to peace-loving,
democratic, liberal Americans. The eirenic ideal of the Good Society is
not the only one existing in human minds. There also exists the agonistic ideal and it must be reckoned with as a powerful psychological
reality. The peaceful dweller of the heavenly city of the eirenic ideal is
despised by him to whom the heavenly city appears as a Valhalla populated by heroic warriors and Valkyries.
The virtues of the soldier, such as fortitude, loyalty, simple-mindedness, discipline, frugality, chivalry and joie de vivre, may be as much
regarded as the ideal as those of the businessman. Since agonistic man
is less given to intellectual reflection than his counterpart, the eirenic
man, the agonistic ideal has found less frequent expression in philosophical systems of ethics than the eirenic. As a matter of fact, until fairly
recent times practically all systems of moral philosophy have been of
the eirenic type. Machiavelli may more properly be called a precursor
than a representative of agonistic moral philosophy. The development
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of such systems has been the work of such recent minds as Nietzsche,
his predecessor Schopenhauer, and his followers Gobineau, Sorel, Treitschke, Klages, Spengler, Sombart, Mussolini, Marinetti or Rosenberg.7
To the convinced believer in eirenic justice, the very application of the
intellect to the elaboration of such systemic glorification of violence appears as treason against the spirit itself. But the fact remains that
these systems have been developed and that there has long before them
existed that attitude of which they are but articulations. In all these
systems we find the glorification of "life" over reason, the deprecation
of the intellect as sterile, the praise of passion, even violent passion, as
creative, the contempt of peaceful harmony as dull and effeminate and
the joyful acceptance of dangerous living in a world of continuous fight
and struggle. To a consistent follower of the agonistic ideal the eirenic
society and its law must appear not as just but unjust. How then can
we postulate the justness of the eirenic law? Is there any standard by
which we can determine the justice of these two ultimate social ideals,
similar to the standard which we have found within each one of these
two ideals for the determination of the justice of a given legal system or
law?
To this ultimate question the answer cannot be provided by reason, at
least not if we define reason as dispassionate reflection about experience. Such reflection can, within the limits already indicated, help us
determine the adequacy or inadequacy of the means by which we may
try to achieve our ultimate end, but cannot aid us in the choice of these
ends themselves. In that choice we are determined by other factors. Reason cannot help us in choosing between Wodan and Christ, between the
spirit of the Gragas and that of the Sermon on the Mount. If we are
materialistically inclined, we may say that this choice is determined by
education, by environment, or by individual variations of inner secretion or other physiological factors. If we are religious, we shall find
our choice determined by faith which, in Christian belief, has to find
its basis in Grace.
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Appreciation of the moral phase of law is retarded by
(1) its commonplaceness; e.g., the occasional observation of an impartial person that "this is the law, but not the justice of the case" con7

Although with reservation, Bergson, Ruskin or Carlyle should also be men-

tioned in this connection. One should also not overlook the conditioning influence

of Darwin, Dostoevski and Freud. None of them, perhaps not even Nietzsche,
should be held responsible for their epigones.
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